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Abstract. In this paper we describe a modal proof system arising from
the combination of a tableau-like classical system, which incorporates
a restricted (“analytic”) version of the cut rule, with a label formal-
ism which allows for a specialised, logic-dependent unification algorithm.
The system provides a uniform proof-theoretical treatment of first-order
(normal) modal logics with and without the Barcan Formula and/or its
converse.
1 Introduction
This paper generalizes the KEM proof method for normal modal propositional
logics described in [AG94] (and further refined and expanded in [ACG94b,ACG94a,Gov95])
to normal systems of first-order modal logic with and without the Barcan For-
mula and/or its converse. The critical feature of the original (propositional)
method, besides its being based on a combination of tableau and natural de-
duction inference rules which allows for a suitably restricted (“analytic”) use of
the cut rule, is that it generates models and checks them for putative contradic-
tions using a label scheme to bookkeep “world” paths. Briefly and informally,
we work with an alphabet of constant and variable “world” symbols. A “world”
label is a world-symbol or a “structured” sequence of world-symbols we call a
“world-path”. Constant and variable world-symbols can be viewed as denoting
worlds and sets of worlds respectively (in a Kripke model), while a world-path
conveys information about access between the worlds in it. We attach labels
to signed formulas (i.e., formulas prefixed with a “T” or “F”) to yield labelled
signed formulas (LS-formulas). A LS-formula TA, i (FA, i) means that A is true
(false) at the (last) world (on the path) i. In the course of the proof, labels are
manipulated in a way closely related to the semantics of modal operators and
“matched” using a specialized (logic-dependent) unification algorithm. That two
structured labels i and k are unifiable means that they virtually represent the
same path, i.e. any world which you could get to by the path i could be reached
by the path k and vice versa. LS-formulas whose labels are unifiable turn out
to be true (false) at the same world(s) relative to the accessibility relation that
holds in the appropriate class of models.
As we show in this paper, such a formalism is readily extended to first-order
versions of the usual normal modal logics by further labelling symbols with the
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individuals in their associated domain. At this end, we introduce two more sets
of formal symbols which play the role of “renamings” of the individual terms
of the language. This allows us to characterise each of the variants of the first-
order modal logics K,D, T, S4, B, S5 by using the familiar quantifier rules of the
tableau method in combination with corresponding appropriate versions of the
modal rules.
2 An Outline of Quantified Modal Logic
In what follows we assume a Modal First-Order Language (without function
symbols) L defined in the usual way. Let C = {c1, c2, . . . } and V = {x1, x2, . . . }
be the sets of individual symbols (resp. constants and variables) and P =
{P1, P2, . . . } the set of predicates of L. A system L of Quantified Modal Logic
(QML) is constituted by
1. classical and modal propositional axioms;
2. ∀x(A→ B)→ (A→ ∀xB(x)), x not free in A;
3. ∀y(∀xA(x)→ A(y))
and possibly by either of (or both) the following formulas (Barcan Formula and
its Converse):
∀x2A(x)→ 2∀xA(x) (BF)
2∀xA(x)→ ∀x2A(x) (CBF)
All the systems of QML we shall be concerned with include modus ponens,
necessitation, and universal generalization. For constant domains we have also
universal instantiation.
A First-Order Kripke ModelM is a 5-tuple 〈W, R,D, e, v〉 whereW is a (non
empty) set of possible worlds, R is the accessibility relation on W, D is a (non
empty) set of individuals, e is a mapping e : W → ℘(D) which assigns to each
possible world a domain of individuals, and v is the usual valuation function
such that, for any cn ∈ C and any wi, wj ∈ W, v(cn, wi) = v(cn, wj) and, for any
n-ary predicate Pm ∈ P and any wi ∈ W, v(Pm, wi) ⊆ (e(wi))n. Furthermore,
formulas are evaluated classically (see [Kri63]).
3 KEM Language and Label Formalism
As usual with refutation methods, a KEM -proof of a formula A consists of
attempting to construct a countermodel for A by assuming that A is false in
some arbitrary model M. In proving formulas of L we shall use labelled signed
formulas (LS-formulas), i.e. expressions of the form SA, i where S ∈ {T, F}, A
is a formula of L and i is a label.
The set = of labels arises from two (non empty) sets ΦC = {w1, w2, . . . }
and ΦV = {W1,W2, . . . } respectively of constants and variable world symbols
through the following definition:
= =
⋃
1≤i
=i where =i is :
=1 = ΦC ∪ ΦV ;
=2 = =1 × ΦC ;
=n+1 = =1 ×=n.
That is, a world-label is either (i) an element of the set ΦC , or (ii) an element
of the set ΦV , or (iii) a path term (k′, k), where (iiia) k′ ∈ ΦC ∪ ΦV and (iiib)
k ∈ ΦC or k = (i′, i), where (i′, i) is a label. From now on we shall use i, j, k, . . .
to denote arbitrary labels.
For any label i = (k′, k) we shall call k′ the head of i, k the body of i,
and denote them by h(i) and b(i) respectively. Notice that these notions are
recursive (they correspond to projection functions): if b(i) denotes the body of
i, then b(b(i)) will denote the body of b(i), b(b(b(i))) will denote the body of
b(b(i)); and so on. We shall call each of b(i), b(b(i)), etc., a segment of i. Let s(i)
denote any segment of i (obviously, by definition every segment s(i) of a label i
is a label); then h(s(i)) will denote the head of s(i).
For any label i, we define the length of i, l(i), as the number of world-symbols
in i, i.e. l(i) = n ⇔ i ∈ =n. sn(i) will denote the segment of i of length n, i.e.
sn(i) = s(i) such that l(s(i)) = n. We shall use hn(i) and in indifferently as
abbreviations for h(sn(i)).
For any label i, l(i) > n, we define the countersegment-n of i, as follows:
cn(i) = h(i)× (· · · × (hk(i)× (· · · × (hn+1(i), w0)))) (n < k < l(i))
where w0 is a “dummy” label, i.e. a label not appearing in i (the context in
which such a notion is applied will tell us what w0 stands for).
Example 1. If i = (w4, (W3, (w3, (W2, w1)))) then l(i) = 5, s3(i) = (w3, (W2, w1))
and its countersegment-3 is c3(i) = (w4, (W3, w0)); intuitively, cn(i) is what re-
mains of i after deleting sn(i).
We shall call a label i restricted if h(i) ∈ ΦC , otherwise unrestricted.
Let us extend L with the following sets of individual symbols: T = {t1, t2, . . . }
(the set of tokens), andM = {m1,m2, . . . } (the set of marks), which will be used
in proving formulas of L. We shall denote by d’s arbitrary elements of T ∪M.
We stipulate that if i ∈ =1 and t1, . . . , tn ∈ T, then iJt1, . . . , tnK ∈ =1. Herein we
shall use iJt1, . . . , tnK to denote (h(i)Jt1, . . . , tnK, b(i)Jt′1, . . . , t′mK).
As an intuitive explanation, we may think of a label i ∈ ΦC as denoting a
world (a given one), and a label i ∈ ΦV as denoting a set of worlds (any world)
in some Kripke model. A label i = (k′, k) may be viewed as representing a path
from k to a (set of) world(s) k′ accessible from k (i.e., from the world(s) denoted
by k). Tokens occurring in a label may be thought of as “known” elements of the
domain of the world(s) in the path represented by the label(s) they are attached
to.
Example 2. The label (W1, w1Jt1K) represents a path which takes us to the set
W1 of worlds accessible from w1, and t1 denotes an element of the domain of
w1; (w2, (W1Jt2, t3K, w1))) represents a path which takes us to a world w2 ac-
cessible via any world accessible from w1, (i.e. accessible from the sub-path
(W1Jt2, t3K, w1)) and t2, t3 stand for individuals “shared” by the worlds denoted
by W1.
4 Unifications
A characteristic feature of KEM proof method is the use of rules for label -
unifications in order to determine whether two labels denote the same world(s)
under the appropriate accessibility conditions. In dealing with first-order normal
modal logics we need rules for terms unification in order to determine whether
two terms (from the sets T andM) denote the same individual under the appro-
priate domain conditions. In this section we provide both kinds of unifications.
4.1 Label Unifications
KEM label unification scheme involves two kinds of unifications, respectively
“high” and “low” unifications. An high unification, σL, is meant to mirror a
single constraint on R, whereas a low unification, σL, is used to simulate the
full range of conditions governing the accessibility relation which characterizes
L. High and low unifications are defined respectively as follows.
High unifications: First of all we define a substitution in the usual way as a
mapping
σ : ΦV −→ = .
For two labels i, k and a substitution σ, if σ is a unifier of i and k then we
shall say that i and k are σ-unifiable. We shall (somewhat unconventionally)
use (i, k)σ to denote both that i and k are σ-unifiable and the result of their
unification. On this basis we define several specialised, logic-dependent notions
of σL-unification. In particular, the notion of two labels i, k being σK-, σD-, σT -,
σ4-,σB-unifiable is defined as follows:
(i, k)σK = (i, k)σ at least one of i and k is restricted, and
∀n ≤ l(i), (sn(i), sn(k))σK
(i, k)σD = (i, k)σ
(i, k)σT =

(sl(k)(i), k)σ l(i) > l(k), and
∀n ≥ l(k), (hn(i), h(k))σ = (h(i), h(k))σ
(i, sl(i)(k))σ l(k) > l(i), and
∀n ≥ l(i), (h(i), hn(k))σ = (h(i), h(k))σ
(i, k)σ4 =

cl(i)(k) l(k) > l(i), h(i) ∈ ΦV and
w0 = (i, sl(i)(k))σ
cl(k)(i) l(i) > l(k), h(k) ∈ ΦV and
w0 = (sl(k)(i), k)σ
(i, k)σB =

(b(b(i)), k)σ if h(i) ∈ ΦV and
(h(i), h(k))σ = (h(b(b(i))), h(k))σ
(i, b(b(k)))σ if h(k) ∈ ΦV and
(h(i), h(k))σ = (h(i), h(b(b(k))))σ
The notions of σD- and σK-unification are related respectively to the accessibility
conditions for D and K. Thus, for example, (w2, (W1, w1)) and (W3, (W2, w1))
are σD- but not σK-unifiable (the segments (W1, w1), (W2, w1) are in fact
not σK-unifiable) since a world accessible from w1 might not exist due to the
lack of seriality. This means that the “denotations” of W1 and W2 might be
empty, which obviously makes their unification impossible. For the notion of σT -
unification, take for example i = (w3, (W1, w1)) and k = (w3, (W2, (w2, w1))).
Here (W2, w3)σ = (w3, w3)σ, then i and k σT -unify to (w3, (w2, w1)). This intu-
itively means that the world w3, accessible from a sub-path s(k) = (W2, (w2, w1)),
after the deletion of W2 from k, is accessible from any path i which turns out
to denote the same world(s) as s(k), the step from w2 to W2 being irrelevant
because of the reflexivity of R. For the notion of σ4-unification take, for ex-
ample, i = (W3, (w2, w1)) and k = (w5, (w4, (w3, (W2, w1)))). Here sl(i)(k) =
(w3, (W2, w1)). Then i and k labels σ4-unify to (w5, (w4, (w3, (w2, w1)))) since
(i, sl(i)(k))σ = ((W3, (w2, w1)), (w3, (W2, w1)))σ. This intuitively means that all
the worlds accessible from a sub-path sl(i)(k) are accessible from any path i which
leads to the same world(s) denoted by sl(i)(k). For the notion of σB-unification
notice, for example, that i = (W1, (w2, w1)) and k = w1 σB-unify to w1 since
(W1, w1)σ = (w1, w1)σ. This intuitively means that b(b(i)) and k denote the
same world, and such a world is one of the worlds accessible by simmetry from
b(i).
Low Unifications: We are now able to combine the above unifications in a single
low unification for L = K,D, T, S4, B, S5.
(i, k)σL =
{
(cn(i), cm(k))σL1···Ln
(i, k)σL1···Ln
where w0 = (sn(i), sm(k))σL and
(i, k)σL1···Ln =

(i, k)σL1
...
(i, k)σLn
where L1 · · ·Ln stand for the axioms characterising L.
For S5 we provide the following specialised σS5-unification:
(i, k)σS5 = (h(i), h(k))σ .
We shall say that i extends k iff there exists an s(i) such that either (i)
s(i) = k or (ii) (s(i), k)σL; and that i extends immediately k iff i extends k and
s(i) = b(i). We now provide a useful property of labels and unifications.
Lemma 1. If (i, k)σL = l then (i, l)σL and (l, k)σL.
Proof. The proof will be by induction on the number of applications of σL1···Ln
in a σL-unification. Let n be the number of such applications. If n = 1 then we
have to prove the property for σL1···Ln 3, which means
(i, k)σL1,...,Ln = l⇒ (i, l)σL1,...,Ln , (k, l)σL1,...,Ln . (1)
We then provide the definition of σDT4
(i, k)σDT4 =

(i, k)σD l(i) = l(k)
(i, k)σT l(i) < l(k), h(i) ∈ ΦC
(i, k)σ4 l(i) < l(k), h(i) ∈ ΦV
At this point we prove the property stated in (1) by induction on the length of
labels.
If min{l(i), l(k)} = 1 then we assume that l(i) = 1 (the proof for l(k) = 1
is similar). 1) i ∈ ΦC . If also l(k) = 1, we apply σD; in every case, by obvious
considerations about σ, l = (i, k)σD = i, but (i, i)σD and (i, k)σD. If l(k) > 1
and (i, k)σT , then l = (i, k)σT = (i, s1(k))σT = i, hence (i, i)σD and (i, k)σT .
If l(k) > 1 and (i, k)σB , then l = (i, k)σB = (i, s1(k))σ = i, therefore (i, i)σD
and (i, k)σB . 2) i ∈ ΦV then by the definition of σ it unifies with any label, in
particular (i, k)σD = k = l, whence (i, k)σD and (k, k)σD.
Let us suppose now that min{l(i), l(k)} = n > 1, and that the property holds
up to n for σL1···Ln . Thus we have the following cases.
L1 · · ·Ln = D and L1 · · ·Ln = K. If l(i) = l(k) then (i, k)σD = l; by the in-
ductive hypothesis (b(i), b(l))σD, (b(k), b(l))σD, (h(i), h(l))σD and (h(k), h(l))σD;
therefore (i, l)σD and (k, l)σD. The proof for K follows from the fact that l con-
tains only constants, which implies that each single element of i and k is either
a variable or the constant occurring in the corresponding place in l.
L1 · · ·Ln = DT . If l(i) < l(k) and (i, k)σT = l, by the inductive hypothesis
(b(i), b(l))σD, (sl(b(i))(k), b(l))σD. By the definition of σT , we know that ln =
(h(i), h(k))σ = (h(i), hl(i)(k))σ); therefore (i, l)σD and (k, l)σT . The case l(i) =
l(k) is the same as the case for D above.
L1 · · ·Ln = DT4. If l(i) < l(k) and h(i) ∈ ΦV , then (i, k)σ4 = cl(i)(k) where
w0 = (i, sl(i)(k))σ. By the inductive hypothesis and the definition of σ we have
3 Hereafter, in order to shorten proofs, when we have to consider labels of different
lengths, we shall assume, unless specified, the first to be the shorter. Obviously proofs
for the other cases carry out in the same way.
(i, sl(i)(l))σ and (sl(i)(k), sl(i)(l))σ and therefore (i, l)σ4 and (k, l)σD. The other
clauses of σDT4 are respectively the cases for T and D above.
L1 · · ·Ln = DTB. If l(i) < l(k) and (i, k)σB = l, by inductive hypothesis
(b(i), b(l))σD, (sl(b(i))(k), b(l))σD; by the definition of σB , we know that ln =
(h(i), h(k))σ = (h(i), h(b(b(i))))σ); therefore (i, l)σD and (k, l)σB . The other
cases of the σDTB are respectively the cases for T and D above.
We have thus proved the inductive base for the lemma. We can now assume
that the lemma holds up to the n-th application of σL1···Ln . By the definition
of σL, (sn(i), sm(k))σL = w0 = sl(l) and (cn(i), cm(k)j)σL1···Ln = cl(l), but, by
the inductive hypothesis, (sn(i), sl(l))σL and (sm(k), sl(l))σL. By the property
we have just proved for σL1···Ln (cn(i), cl(l))σL1···Ln and (cm(k), cl(l))σL1···Ln ,
which implies (i, l)σL and (k, l)σL.
For S5 we have (i, k)σS5 iff (h(i), h(k))σ, whence, if i is restricted, then
(i, k)σS5 = hi = l and thus (i, l)σS5, i.e. (h(i), h(i))σ, and similarly for k; other-
wise (i, k)σS5 = h(k) = l, therefore for the same reason as in the previous case
(k, l)σS5 and (i, l)σS5.
4.2 Term Unifications
As said before, in proving formulas of L we use two kinds of symbols — tokens
and marks — associated to world domains. Therefore we have to determine,
via an appropriate unification, whether two such symbols denote the same in-
dividual(s) relative to a given world. In order to deal with constant, increasing,
decreasing and varying domains we introduce a domain dependent ρ-unification
between terms.
Given a set of labels L the ρ-unification is just the usual unification with
the constraint that an indexed mark (mn)i, i ∈ =, ρ-unifies with a term d iff
either i) d is a token tm attached to a label k ∈ L (kJtmK), such that (i, k)σL,
or ii) d is a mark. Two indexed marks, (mp)i and (mq)k, ρ-unify iff (i, k)σL.
For constant domains we only require that a mark ρ-unifies with a token iff the
token is attached to a label in L. For varying domain in a broader sense the
ρ-unification is defined formally as follows:
(d, d′)ρ =

d if d = d′
(d)(i,k)σL if d = (m)i, d
′ = (m′)k, and (i, k)σL
t if d′ = (m)k and d = t ∈ D(kσLL)
t′ if d = (m)i and d′ = t′ ∈ D(iσLL)
where D(iσLL) (D(kσ
L
L)) is the set of tokens extracted from the head of i (k) and
from the head of the labels in L unifying with i (k).
5 Inference Rules
In displaying the rules of KEM we shall use Smullyan-Fitting α, β, γ, δ, ν, pi
unifying notation [Fit83]. As usual XC will denote the conjugate of X, i.e. the
result of changing the sign of X to its opposite. Two LS-formulas X(d), i and
XC(d′), k such that (i, k)σL and (d, d′)ρ will be called σLρ-complementary. We
shall write a β-formula also as [β1, β2].
Propositional Rules
α, k
αn, k
[n = 1, 2] (α-rules)
[β1(d1), β2(d2)], k
βCn (d), l
β3−n(d3−n), (k, l)σL
[(k, l)σL, (dn, d)ρ and n = 1, 2] (β-rules)
Rewriting Rules
X(cn), i
X(tn), iJtnK (constant rewriting rule)
For constant domains tn is always attached to i, whereas for varying domain in a
broader sense it is attached to i iff X(cn) is atomic, i.e. X(cn) = TP (cn) for some
predicate P .
X(xn), i
X(mn)i, i
(variable rewriting rule)
Quantifier Rules
γ, iJt1, . . . , tnK
γ0(mn)i, iJt1, . . . , tnK [mn new] (γ-rules)
δ, iJt1, . . . , tnK
δ0(tm), iJt1, . . . , tn, tmK [h(i) ∈ ΦC and tm new] (δ-rules)
δ, iJt1, . . . , tnK
δ0(tm), iJt1, . . . , tnK [h(i) ∈ ΦV and tm new] (δ-rules)
Modal Rules
ν, i
ν0, (i′, i)
[i′ ∈ ΦV and new] (ν-rules)
pi, i
pi0, (i′, i)
[i′ ∈ ΦC and new] (pi-rules)
Modal Rules for Increasing Domains
ν, iJt1, . . . , tnK
ν0, (i′Jt1, . . . , tnK, iJt1, . . . , tnK) [i′ ∈ ΦV and new] (νI-rules)
pi, iJt1, . . . , tnK
pi0, (i′Jt1, . . . , tnK, iJt1, . . . , tnK) [i′ ∈ ΦC and new] (piI-rules)
Domains Rules
i[t1, . . . , tn]
k[t′1, . . . , t′m]
(i, k)σLJt1, . . . , tn, t′1, . . . , t′mK (Domains rule)
iJt1, . . . , tnK
kJt′1, . . . , t′mK
kJt1, . . . , tn, t′1, . . . , t′mK [k extends i] (Increasing domains rule)
iJt1, . . . , tnK
kJt′1, . . . , t′mK
kJt1, . . . , tn, t′1, . . . , t′mK [i extends k] (Decreasing domains rule)
iJt1, . . . , tnK
kJt′1, . . . , t′mK
kJt1, . . . , tn, t′1, . . . , t′mK [i immediately extends k]
(Increasing Symmetric domains rule)
Structural Rules
X(d), i
XC(d′), k
×(i, k)σL [(i, k)σL and (d, d
′)ρ] (PNC)
X, i XC , i
[i restricted] (PB)
When we split with respect to X(mn)i, after the application of PB, (mn)i should be
instantiated, in both branches, to the same token; X and XC do not contain variables.
Here the α rules are just the familiar linear branch-expansion rules of the tableau
method. In place of the usual tableau branching β rules we have a set of linear 2-
premise β rules which represent well-known natural inference principles (such as
disjunctive syllogism and its dual, modus ponens, and modus tollens). For exam-
ple, from β, k = TP (m1)w1 → Q(t1), (W1, w1Jt1K), where β1(d1) = FP (m1)w1 ,
β2(d2) = TQ(t1), and βC1 (d), l = TP (t2), (w2, w1Jt1K) we get β2(d2), (k, l)σL =
TQ(t1), (w2, w1Jt1K) since ((W1, w1Jt1K), (w2, w1Jt1K))σL and ((m1)w1 , t2)ρ. Ac-
cording to the rewriting rules, whenever constants or variables occur in an in-
ference step, a “name” (respectively a token or a mark) is given to each of
them. Technically, a rewriting substitution is applied to pick up individuals in
a given domain, and possibly to attach them to labels. The γ and δ rules are
the usual quantifier rules of the tableau method modified in such a way as to
attach the instantiation of the quantified variable to the current label (notice
that in the δ rules tokens cannot be attached to unrestricted labels according to
their intuitive interpretation). The ν and pi rules are as usual for constant and
varying domains, whereas for increasing domains they take care of monotonicity.
The domains rules remind Gabbay’s visa rules [Gab94] and allow us to “move”
individuals through worlds according to the domains conditions. “New” in the
proviso for the modal and quantifier rules means “new to the branch”. PB (for
Principle of Bivalence) is a 0-premise branching rule which plays the role of the
cut rule of the sequent calculus (intuitive meaning: a formula A is either true or
false in any given world, whence the requirement that i should be restricted).
In the course of proof search we shall use an “analytic” version of KEM where
every application of PB is restricted to immediate sub-formulas of β formulas
already occurring in the branch (for further discussion see [DM94,AG94]). PNC
(for Principle of Non-Contradiction) corresponds to the familiar branch-closure
rule of the tableau method, saying that from the occurrence of a pair of σLρ-
complementary LS-formulas X(d), i and XC(d′), k on a branch, we may infer
the closure (“×”) of the branch. The (i, k)σL in the “conclusion” of PNC means
that the contradiction holds “in the same world” for the same individual. La-
bels are manipulated, according to these rules, in such a way that (1) in all the
inferences via an α rule the label of the premise carries over unchanged to the
conclusion; (2) in all inferences via a β rule the labels and terms of the premises
must be respectively σL- and ρ-unifiable, so that the conclusion inherits their
unification (this reflects the obvious fact that classical inferences are valid only
within a given world and with respect to given individuals); (3) in all inferences
via a ν and pi rule the label of the premise is immediately extended to a new
(restricted or unrestricted) label according to the domain conditions; and (4) for
K, PB is applied only to already existing restricted labels.
6 Examples
In this section we provide some example proofs. The notions of a KEM -tree
and of a KEM -proof are as in the propositional case.
The following formula is S4-provable for varying domains.
1. F3∃x2(((Px ∧Rx) ∨ 2Qx)→ 2∀y3(Qy → Py)) w1
2. F∃x2(((Px ∧Rx) ∨ 2Qx)→ 2 Ay3(Qy ∨ Py)) (W1, w1)
3. F2(((Pm(W1,w1) ∧Rm(W1,w1)) ∨ 2Qm(W1,w1))→ 2∀y3(Qy ∨ Py)) (W1, w1)
4. F ((Pm(W1,w1) ∧Rm(W1,w1)) ∨ 2Qm(W1,w1))→ 2∀y3(Qy ∨ Py) (w2, (W1, w1))
5. T (Pm(W1,w1) ∧Rm(W1,w1)) ∨ 2Qm(W1,w1) (w2, (W1, w1))
6. F2∀y3(Qy ∨ Py) (w2, (W1, w1))
7. F∀y3(Qy ∨ Py) (w3, (w2, (W1, w1)))
8. F3(Qt1 ∨ Pt1) (w3Jt1K, (w2, (W1, w1)))
9. FQt1 ∨ Pt1 (W2, (w3Jt1K, (w2, (W1, w1))))
10. FQt1 (W2, (w3Jt1K, (w2, (W1, w1))))
11. FP t1 (W2, (w3Jt1K, (w2, (W1, w1))))
12. T2Qm(W1,w1) (w2, (W1, w1))
14. TQm(W1,w1) (w4, (w2, (W1, w1)))
15.×
13. F2Qm(W1,w1) (w2, (W1, w1))
16. TPm(W1,w1) ∧Rm(W1,w1) (w2, (W1, w1))
17. TPm(W1,w1) (w2, (W1, w1))
18. TRm(W1,w1) (w2, (W1, w1))
19.×
The steps from 1 to 11 are straightforward. At this point we have a β formula
but not βC1 nor β
C
2 , thus we apply PB w.r.t. 2Qm(W1,w1) and (w2, (W1, w1)).
In the left branch, we obtain 14 which is a formula σS4ρ-complementary of 10,
since their labels σS4-unify and (t1,m(W1,w1))ρ, because t1 ∈ D((W1, w1)σLS4),
(i.e. ((W1, w1), (w3, (w2, (W1, w1))))σS4). In the right branch, we get 17 which
is, similarly, σS4ρ-complementary of 11. Notice that m(w−1,w1) is instantiated in
both branches to the same token t1.
The following are KEM -proofs of the Barcan Formula and of its Converse.
1. F∀x2A(x)→ 2∀xA(x) w1
2. T∀x2A(x) w1
3. F2∀xA(x) w1
4. T2A(m1)w1 w1
5. F∀xA(x) (w2, w1)
6. TA(m1)w1 (W1, w1)
7. FA(t1) (w2Jt1K, w1)
8.×
The steps from 1 to 7 are straightforward. For decreasing domains, we apply
to 7 the decreasing domains rule thus obtaining (w2Jt1K, w1Jt1K). At this point
((W1, w1), (w2Jt1K, w1Jt1K))σL and ((m1)w1 , t1)ρ because t1 ∈ D(w1σLL), so the
tree is closed. Notice that ((m1)w1 , t1)ρ holds also for constant domains, thus
proving the formula for the corresponding systems.
1. F2∀xA(x)→ ∀x2A(x) w1
2. T2∀xA(x) w1
3. F∀x2A(x) w1
4. T∀xA(x) (W1, w1)
5. TA(m1)(W1,w1) (W1, w1)
6. F2A(t1) w1Jt1K
7. FA(t1) (w2, w1Jt1K)
8.×
The steps from 1 to 7 are straightforward. For increasing domains we apply
to 7 the increasing domains rule thus obtaining (w2Jt1K, w1Jt1K). At this point
((W1, w1), (w2Jt1K, w1Jt1K))σL and ((m1)w1 , t1)ρ because t1 ∈ D(w1σLL), so the
tree is closed. Notice that ((m1)w1 , t1)ρ holds also for constant domains, thus
proving the formula for the corresponding systems. It is important to note (and
easy to verify) that the order of the applications of the modal and quantifiers
rules leading to the nodes 5 and 6 is irrelevant, since such rules are wholly
permutable (for the problem of order dependence which arises from the non-
permutability of the usual modal and quantifiers tableau rules see [Wal90]).
7 Soundness and Completeness
LetM = 〈W, R,D, e, v〉 be an L-model whereW = ΦC ; R is a binary relation on
W; D = T; e and v are as before. In particular, for any ck ∈ C, tk ∈ T, xk ∈ V,
mk ∈M and any wj ∈ W, v(ck, wj) = v(tk, wj) and v(xk, wj) = v(mk, wj).
Let g be a function from = to ℘(W) thus defined:
g(i) =

h(i) = {h(i)} if h(i) ∈ ΦC
h(i) = {wi ∈ W : g(b(i))Rwi} if h(i) ∈ ΦV
i =W if i ∈ ΦV
Let a be a function from T ∪M to ℘(T) thus defined:
a(d) =
{
Ti ∈ ℘(T) if d = (mn)i
{tn} if d = tn ∈ T
where Ti = e(g(i)) if i is restricted, and Ti = ∩e(g(i)) otherwise.
Let r be a function from = to R thus defined:
r(i) =
{
∅ if l(i) = 1
g(i1)Rg(i2), . . . , g(in−1)Rg(h(i)) if l(i) = n > 1
Let f be a function from LS-formulas to v thus defined:
f(SA, i) =def v(A,wj) = S
for all wj ∈ g(i).
Lemma 2. For any i, k ∈ = if (i, k)σL then g(i) ∩ g(k) 6= ∅.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of applications of σL1,...,Ln in
σL. We need first to prove the following:
Lemma 3. For any i, k ∈ = if (i, k)σL then g(i) ∩ g(k) 6= ∅.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of labels. If min{l(i), l(k)} = 1,
then at least one of i and k is either a constant or a variable, so that five cases
will be present. By the definition of unifications i, k are either: i) two constants,
or ii) a variable and a constant, or iii) two variables, or iv) a variable and a label,
or v) a constant and a label.4
Case i) Two constants unify if and only if they are the same constant, and
so i = k; therefore from the definition of g, g(i) = g(k) and so g(i) ∩ g(k) 6= ∅.
Case ii) If i (resp. k) is a variable and k (resp. i) is a constant, then g(i) =W
and g(k) ∈ ℘(W) therefore also in this case g(i) ∩ g(k) 6= ∅.
Case iii) and iv) These cases are identical to the previous ones because: 1)W
is not empty, and 2) the variable is mapped toW and the label to some world(s)
in it.
Case v) This case implies that (i, k)σT or (i, k)σB . Let us assume, for the sake
of economy, that l(i) = 1 and l(k) = n > 1. If (i, k)σT , then for each h(s(k))
such that l(s(k)) > 1 either h(s(k)) ∈ ΦV , or h(s(k)) = i; therefore r(k) =
4 Cases ii), iii), and iv) are not found in KEM proofs, but they are useful both for
dealing with cases in the inductive step and for case v).
iRk2, . . . , kn−1Rkn. If k2 ∈ ΦV , then k2 denotes the set of worlds accessible
from i; if k2 ∈ ΦC , then i = k, but, through reflexivity i ⊆ k2, so we take i as a
representative of the set denoted by k2, which implies iRk3. We repeat the same
argument until we arrive at iRkn: if kn ∈ ΦC , then i = kn and so they denote
the same world; if kn ∈ ΦV , then it denotes the set of worlds accessible from i;
but i belongs to such a set, therefore, in all cases g(i) ∩ g(k) 6= ∅. If (i, k)σB ,
then h(k) ∈ ΦV , (i, h(k))σ and (i, b(b(k)))σ; moreover r(k) = k1Rk2, k2Rk3,
but k1 = i, and, by symmetry k2Rk1, which implies k1 ∩ k3 6= ∅, therefore
g(i) ∩ g(k) 6= ∅.
For the inductive step we have min{l(i), l(k)} = n > 1. Let us assume induc-
tively that the lemma is valid up to n; if l(i) = l(k) we shall write i and k as
(h(i), b(i)) and (h(k), b(k)), respectively. If (i, k)σD, by the definition of σD we
get (b(i), b(k))σD, for which the lemma holds; let wj be one of the worlds shared
by b(i) and b(k), whence wjRh(i) and wjRh(k). We have now only to analyse
what kind of labels are h(i) and h(k), which falls under the cases i), ii), and iii).
Cases i) and ii) are the same as the inductive base. We have thus to examine case
iii). Both h(i) and h(k) denotes the set of worlds accessible from wj , but such a
set is not empty because of the seriality of R. If (i, k)σK we repeat the argument
for D apart from cases iii), iv), and v) of the base which are not allowed in σK .
If l(i) 6= l(k), we shall assume that l(i) < l(k) (the case l(k) < l(i) is dealt
with in the same way). If (i, k)σT and h(i) ∈ ΦC then (i, sl(i)(k))σD, therefore,
combining the proofs of the previous case and case v) of the inductive base we
obtain the desired result. If h(i) ∈ ΦV , then for all kn, n ≤ l(i), (h(i), h(k))σ =
(h(i), kn)σ which means g(i)∩g(sn(k)) 6= ∅, and in particular g(i)∩g(sl(i)(k)) 6=
∅.
If (i, k)σ4 then h(i) ∈ ΦV and (b(i), sl(i)−1(k))σD, for which the inductive
hypothesis holds; let wj be such a shared world. h(i) denotes all the worlds ac-
cessible from wj , but, due to transitivity, the world(s) denoted by h(k) belong(s)
to h(i) and so g(i) ∩ g(k) 6= ∅.
If (i, k)σB and l(i) ≤ l(k) then h(k) ∈ ΦV and (i, b(b(k)))σ, for which the
inductive hypothesis hold; let wj be such a shared world. By repeating the same
argument as for case v) of the base for B we get g(i) ∩ g(k) 6= ∅.
We now return to the proof of the main lemma. If σL consists of a single step of
σL1···Ln , then (i, k)σL = (i, k)σL1···Ln ; by Lemma 3 we obtain g(i) ∩ g(k) 6= ∅.
Let us assume, inductively, that the lemma holds up to n. If σL consists of
n+ 1 applications of σL1···Ln -unifications, then (i, k)σL = (ci(i), ck(k))σL1···Ln
where (si(i), sk(k))σL, which contains n applications of σL1···Ln , and so the
lemma holds for it. We can now repeat the argument of Lemma 3 with respect
to (ci(i), ck(k))σL1···Ln , proving thus that g(i) ∩ g(k) 6= ∅.
For σS5 the proof turns out to be the proof for the cases i), ii) and iii) of the
inductive base of Lemma 3.
Lemma 4. For any d, d′, if (d, d′)ρ then a(d) ∩ a(d′) 6= ∅.
Proof. If d, d′ ∈ M we have to check whether the labels, say i, k, attached to
them are the same label or they σL-unify. In both cases, by Lemma 2 and the
fact that the domains of the worlds are not empty we obtain the desired result.
If d = tn and tn ∈ D(kσLL), then tn belongs to the domain of k which is the set
Tk; therefore also in this case a(d) ∩ a(d′) 6= ∅. If d = d′ then a(d) = a(d′) and
so a(d) ∩ a(d′) 6= ∅ trivially.
Lemma 5. For any i, k ∈ = and d, d′, if f(SA(d), i), (i, k)σL and (d, d′)ρ then
f(SA(d′), (i, k)σL).
Proof. Let us suppose that the lemma does not hold, so that v(A(d), wj) = S
and v(A(d′), wh) = SC , for all wj ∈ g(i) and wh ∈ g(k). However, according to
Lemma 2 and Lemma 4 g(i) ∩ g(k) 6= ∅ and a(d) ∩ a(d′) 6= ∅, which means that
there is a world wm ∈ g((i, k)σL) and an individual tn ∈ a((d, d′)ρ) such that
v(A(tn), wm) = S and v(A(tn), wm) = SC , thus obtaining a contradiction.
Theorem 1. |=L A ⇐⇒ `L A.
Proof. For a proof see, for example, [HC68,Gab76].
Theorem 2. `L A⇒`KEM(L) A.
Proof. The characteristic axioms of L and modus ponens are provable in KEM
(see section 6 for a proof of the Barcan Formula and of its Converse, [Gov96]
for a proof of some characteristic axioms and of necessitation, and [DM94] for
a proof that modus ponens is a derived rule in the propositional fragment of
KEM). Here we prove that universal generalisation is a derived rule of KEM .
1. TAx w1
2. T∀xAx w1
4. TA(m1)w1 w1
3. F∀xAx w1
5. FAt1 w1Jt1K
6.×
Theorem 3. `KEM(L) A⇒ |=L A.
Proof. The α-rules and PB are obviously sound rules inM. For the β-rules and
PNC: by the hypothesis (l, k)σL and (d, d′)ρ, then, by Lemma 1, (i, (i, k)σL)σL
and (k, (i, k)σL)σL hence, by Lemma 5, the formulas involved have the same
value in g(i), g(k) and g((i, k)σL); after that these rules become rules of KE,
and thus they are sound rules in M.
For Domains Rule. If (i, k)σL then g(i)∩ g(k) 6= ∅. We have thus to consider
three cases:
Case i) h(i), h(k) ∈ ΦC ; then g(i) = g(k) and so (i, k)σLJt1, . . . , tn, t′1, . . . , t′mK.
Case ii) h(i) ∈ ΦV and h(k) ∈ ΦC (or vice versa); then g(i) ∩ g(k) = g(k).
Each wi ∈ g(i) is such that wiJt1, . . . , tnK, and g(k) is g(k)Jt′1, . . . , t′mK, and so
(i, k)σLJt1, . . . , tn, t′1, . . . , t′mK.
Case iii) h(i), (h(k)) ∈ ΦV ; in this case g(i) ∩ g(k) = g((i, k)σL). Any worlds
wi ∈ g(i) and wk ∈ g(k) are such that wiJt1, . . . , tnK and wkJt′1, . . . , t′mK, so
(i, k)σLJt1, . . . , tn, t′1, . . . , t′mK.
For Increasing Domains Rule. We know that k extends i, so g(i)Rng(k) or
g((i, s(k))σL)Rng(k) by Lemma 2; however both cases implies e(g(i)) ⊆ e(g(k)),
and so kJt1, . . . , tn, t′1, . . . , t′mK.
The proofs for the Decreasing- Increasing Symmetric- Domains Rule are sim-
ilar to that for Increasing Domain Rule.
For Constant Rewriting Rule. By the semantic conditions, for any wi ∈
W and any cn, tn, v(cn, wi) = v(tn, wi) ∈ a(tn). For constant domains, since
v(tn, wi) = tn ∈ e(g(i)), then iJtnK and so f(SA(cn), i) = f(SA(tn), iJtnK). For
varying domains, by the definition of the valuation function, f(SA(cn), i) =
f(SA(tn), iJtnK) iff SA(cn) = TP (cn) for some predicate P .
For Variable Rewritting Rule. By the semantic conditions, for any wj ∈
g(i), v(xn, wj) = v((mn)wj , wj). Moreover, e(wj) = Twj and v((mn)wj , wj) =
a((mn)wj , wj) = Twj , therefore, f(SA(xn), i) = f(SA(mn)i, i).
For δ-rules. We show the proof only for δ = T∃xA (the other case fol-
lows by the usual interdefinability of quantifiers). Let us suppose that i ∈ ΦC ,
f(δ, g(iJt1, . . . , tnK)) = S and f(δ0(tm), g(iJt1, . . . , tn, tmK)) = SC , thus δ0(tm) =
FA(tm) and so we have T¬A(tm). Since tm is new to the branch, then T∀x¬A(x),
and so T¬∃xA(x), contrary to the hypothesis. The proof for i unrestricted is
similar.
For ν-rules. Let us suppose ν = T2A; for all wj ∈ g(i) and for all wm ∈
g((i′, i)), v(2A,wj) = T ; but v(2A,wj) = T iff ∀wm : wjRwm, v(A,wm) = T ,
and (∀wm : wjRwm, v(A,wm) = T ) = f(ν0, i′) with i′ unrestricted. The proof
for pi-rules is similar. For the νI- and the piI-rules it is sufficient to combine the
above proofs for ν-rules, pi-rules and Increasing Domains Rule.
From Theorems 1, 2, and 3 we obtain:
Theorem 4. `KEM(L) A ⇐⇒ |=L A.
8 Final Remarks
In the last ten years several theorem proving systems for first-order modal logic
have been proposed. All suffer of severe limitations. For example, resolution
[AM86] and translation [AE92,?] based methods are bound to resort to ad hoc
methods of preprocessing the input formulas. Furthermore, resolution methods
fail to provide a simple and uniform treatment of the full range of modal log-
ics (see e.g. [AM86]). Sequent/tableau inference techniques [Fit88,?,?] avoid (in
part, at least) these limitations (indeed [Fit88] tableau system with “branch
modification” rules works only for non symmetric “cumulative” domain log-
ics). However, both resolution and sequent/tableau inference rules fail to solve
the problem associated with the non-permutability of the quantifier and modal
rules (this holds true for both [AM86] and [Fit93] “prefixed” tableaux). Wallen’s
[Wal90] matrix proof (an extension of Bibel’s classical connection) method is
devised to overcome all these shortcomings. Its major drawback is that it yields
proofs in a familiar, “natural deduction” style (e.g. in the form of sequent or
tableau proofs) only derivatively and it works only for a few standard modal
logics (it does not cover the “symmetric” B logics. Gent’s [Gen93] generaliza-
tion of Wallen’s matrix proof method works for a wider range of logics but, unlike
Wallen’s, Gent’s method requires translation of the modal formulas into a logic
of restricted quantification). Of the theorem proving systems just mentioned,
Jackson and Reichgelt’s [JR89]’s sequent based proof method is the most simi-
lar to ours, in that it allows the label of the formulas occurring in the proof and
of the terms chosen as the instantiation of the quantified variables (labels are
attached to individuals to indicate in which worlds they are introduced) to be
matched using a unification algorithm plus some pieces of “external” reasoning
concerning the appropriate accessibility restrictions.
The interest in the system just presented is that it provides a uniform treat-
ment of QML without normal-forming or translation procedures. Furthermore
it offers a simple solution to the permutation problem which arises at the level
of the usual (tableau and resolution) quantifier and modal rules by making the
search space wholly insensitive to their application order. But (unlike Wallen’s
matrix proof method) it implements directly familiar, natural inference patterns
(it is, however, also well suited as a framework for representing proofs discov-
ered by means of connection matrix proof-search methods). Finally, its label
unification scheme (unlike Jackson and Reichgelt’s) avoids skolemization and
recursively embodies the conditions on the accessibility relation for the various
modal logics, thus dispensing proof search from any piece of “external” reason-
ing.
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